I. Introduction
THE MOST IMPORTANT CONCEPTUAL TRAJECTORY in the early career of I. A. Richards begins and ends in Chinese moral philosophy. This relationship cannot be said to be rigorous in any formal sinological sense, and though our understanding of Richards's thought is enhanced by an examination of its Chinese reference points, the Chung Yung and Mencius, and while his general observations on language and aesthetics may shed an indirect light on those works, there is no pretence to a scholarly commentary on Confucianism. On the other hand, if Richards's engagement is narrow it is also precise and persistent, and if it suggests opportunism it is of a particularly determined and judicious kind. 1 Clear recognition of this engagement has more than historical value, since it disposes of various confusions regarding Richards's views on the functions of language, some of them misapprehensions that he himself encouraged through simplifications of his scheme, specifically the binary theories offered in Principles of Literary Criticism (1924) and Science and Poetry (1926) , which remain for most readers an insurmountable obstacle to understanding the pattern of work that preceded and succeeded these books. But if they are regarded as a misleading diversion, the main narrative of Richards's thought in the period becomes clear, with surprising consequences. Practical Criticism A sketch map of this movement may assist engagement with the detailed discussion that follows. Richards's early psychology noted a major division between verbal, pictorial, or musical stimuli that array psychological impulses in dynamic equilibria, but with no further outward consequences, and those that bring them into harmony, with resultant action. Richards used Chinese thought to articulate this contrast, which corresponds to that between the experiences usually described as prestige aesthetic responses, and those with virtues that are more usually understood as persuasive rhetoric.
In response to this division, Richards and Ogden enhanced their emerging linguistic scheme to identify a range of functions, namely, reference, expressions of attitude to referent and reader, and the promotion of intended effects. Typical utterance diverges from the first of these owing to interference from the others, and different combinations of these divergent functions generate equilibria or harmonies of impulses.
However, in Principles of Literary Criticism and in Science and Poetry reference to harmonies of impulses was allowed to lapse, and Richards invited a stark comparison between poetry (aesthetic equilibria) and science ( pure symbolisation of reference). This banal reduction of the earlier scheme made him well known but very quickly revealed itself as a failure, and in Practical Criticism, perhaps partly as a result of visits to China and Japan in 1927, Richards returned to his earlier formulation of the language functions with a renewed emphasis on harmonies of impulses, this time with a novel reflection on their political and civic moral relevance, a position that is developed further, though not to completion, in Mencius on the Mind (1932). Coleridge on Imagination (1934) can be understood as a parallel attempt to clarify his views on equilibria, before returning to the question of harmonies in the project that was initially entitled, as early as 1929, 'The Philosophy of Rhetoric', and published in reverse order as Interpretation in Teaching (1938) and The Philosophy of Rhetoric (1936) .
II. The Sense of Beauty (1920-1921)
Work on 'The Sense of Beauty' began in late July or August 1920 when Richards and his friend the painter James Wood agreed to work together, with C. K. Ogden as a third party, on a paper on the language of aesthetics.
3 Wood's role is obscure, but should not be underestimated; Richards was still taking his advice during the composition of Practical Criticism in 1928, and he was clear that the Chinese material which plays so large a part in 'The Sense of Beauty' was Wood's contribution: it was James (Jas) Wood who first awakened my interest in the multiple potentialities of Chinese phrases. We compared different translations of them in a kind of rapture. It was he who brought the Chung Yung into our Foundations.
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This retrospective summary is coloured by Richards's subsequent interest in multiple definition, but the article itself shows that Wood and Richards were employing the concepts of equilibrium and harmony that they found in the Chinese texts as a convenient sign for a range of similar categorisations familiar in formal aesthetics, certainly back to Schiller, and also found in two books then widely read, W. M. Urban's Valuation: Its Nature and Laws (1909) and Ethel D. Puffer's Psychology of Beauty (1905). However, there are aspects to the distinction as it appears in the Chung Yung that are distinct and valuable, as a comparison with Urban demonstrates. Ogden, Richards, and Wood introduce the following passage from Valuation with the observation that it is a 'solid and satisfactory adaptation of this theory of equilibrium to the modern psychology of appreciation': the concept of the widened ground of diffused stimulation, the balance of impulses, so that no one shall constitute an illusiondisturbing moment and lead to readjustment in a new value movement; the consequent repose of conation in the object and the expansion of feeling which goes with it. The ordering, rearrangement of content characteristic of the aesthetic experience is, therefore, in the service of the deepening, or enhancement of that fundamental mode of worth experience which is appreciatively described as the immanental reference …. give it little further resonance. By contrast, the informal, indirect, observations of the Chinese text are free-standing, richly suggestive, and have sufficient play in their terms to permit discussion of a range of matters well beyond those of Urban's sentences, where the terms are deliberately engineered to fine tolerances in order to rule out such further movement:
My master the celebrated Chang says: 'Having no leanings is called Chung, admitting of no change is called Yung. By Chung is denoted Equilibrium; Yung is the fixed principle regulating everything under heaven.' … When anger, sorrow, joy, pleasure are in being but are not manifested, the mind may be said to be in a state of Equilibrium; when the feelings are stirred and co-operate in due degree the mind may be said to be in a state of Harmony. Equilibrium is the great principle.
If both Equilibrium and Harmony exist everything will occupy its proper place and all things will be nourished and flourish. Furthermore, whereas Urban, and the other sources already noted, are more narrowly concerned with defining the quality of equilibrium in an aesthetic response, the Chung Yung permits the identification of concerted arrangements of impulses that are also common in the arts. 'The Sense of 6 This goal encouraged a concentration on the aesthetic responses characterised by equilibria of impulses, and a neglect of harmonies of impulses. The lectures, however, characterise both at considerable length and with carefully selected exemplars, both by Scott, and both included in Palgrave's Golden Treasury. In Lecture 9 in January 1921, Richards began by asking himself why any particular poem is worth reading, and observed that in spite of superficial similarities the 'reasons for the excellence of the "Coronach" are different from those which explain the greatness of "Proud Maisie"', and these differences are 'not … of degree but of kind'. Before passing on to his detailed reasons it is worth engaging with the specimens presented: Having read the poems to his audience Richards then attempted to account for the manifest differences in a way that gave due credit to each, 9 Sir Walter Scott, 'Coronach', ibid., p. 255.
Proud Maisie
though it is clear that equilibrium, which he was sometimes calling 'balance', is his principal focus: 'With Coronach it's a question of the awakening of a certain group of emotions, and of the consistent sequence of these emotions, so that they mutually support one another. It's a question of maintaining an emotional level, and keeping it full and rounded as it were, and just strong enough.… With "Proud Maisie" it's a different matter altogether. It is a question of a balance of Impulses.'
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Richards then attempts to be more specific about the interaction of impulses in a poem, something he does nowhere else in his writing:
With the first verse we have a group of impulses brought into play, large group, very active.
Then with the second verse the first two lines add another group, quite sharply distinguishable, and then at once with the last two lines in comes an opposing group of impulses, almost antagonistic.
Some impulses even here of these two groups overlap. 'six braw gentlemen'.
But the two groups are mainly antagonistic and would, I think, without the setting merely sharpen themselves.
They do this in the next verse with almost a deadlock until the 'duly' upon which the whole emotional tone of the poem changes. The impulses seem to spread and widen. The whole of the personality of the reader comes into play. The word gives the hint, so to speak, for the sense of inevitability, of repose which then begins. It is this sudden repose inside the stress of rival impulses which I call here balance or equilibrium.
The whole disturbance of the poem becomes stabilised or balanced, though free to swing.
The final line, in fact, swings it again, 'Welcome proud lady', but the oscillation is now secure.
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Richards then returns to the 'Coronach' in order to show that while balance is a very desirable quality, and a superior one, it is not the only 10 Lecture 9, p. 4. Notebook 4, RCM. 11 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
virtue. The merit of the 'Coronach', he explains, is 'emotional consistency', 'which in this case definitely bars out the possibility of balance '. 12 Reference to the distinction between equilibrium and harmony as outlined in 'The Sense of Beauty' is relevant:
In equilibrium, there is no tendency to action, and any concert-goer must have realized the impropriety of the view that action is the proper outcome of aesthetic appreciation. When impulses are 'harmonized' on the other hand they work together, and such disciplined co-ordination in action is much to be desired in other places. When works of art produce such action, or conditions which lead to action, they have either not completely fulfilled their function or would in the view of equilibrium here being considered be called not 'beautiful' but 'stimulative'.
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Lecture 10, one of the most fluent of the lectures, expands on this point:
The major emotions such as joy, fear, horror, melancholy, anger, regret, mirth, and the things which are hardly emotions although emotional such as love, veneration, sentimentality seem to correspond to fairly definite and special systems or groups of impulses. Now there is a definite kind of poetry, a special kind of literature whose aim is the development of these definite emotions through these definite groups of impulses. 14 Richards calls this 'emotional art', and cites both the 'Coronach' and Tennyson's 'Break, break, break'. However, while agreeing that the popularity it enjoys is deserved, Richards suggests that it is a limited form since poems of this kind 'exercise a part only of the personality'. Harmony, he remarks, is a 'kind of capture of the personality' by a subset of the impulses, and involves the subjugation of some. 15 Richards traces the links between various inferior grades of harmony, including 'commonplace', where the impulse set is so simple that it offers no challenge to the mind, and the rather more complex case of 'persuasive art', where the arousal of sufficiently harmonious groups of impulses may lead to action. The real value of the impulse account, and particularly this distinction between 12 Ibid., p. 7. 13 'The Sense of Beauty' (1920), p. 89. 14 Lecture 10, pp. 3-4, Notebook 5, RCM. 15 Ibid., p. 7.
harmony and equilibrium, is that it offers an explanatory account of a common readerly intuition:
with the poetry of balance of equilibrium … the most striking thing is often the extraordinary diversity and incongruity of the elements. There is present the strangeness which has so often been remarked in the most excellent beauty. 16 Breaking this experience down Richards lists three areas of peculiarity:
1. Impersonality, disinterestedness, detachment or aloofness, or distance, unconcernedness.
2. Self possession, calm, collectedness, serenity, freedom, catharsis.
3. Completeness, finality, self-sufficiency.
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It is this last which interests him most, the sense that we have 'an experience which is entire', that it 'seems not to need any other to enhance it, but to contain all that could enhance it'. The root of this 'Godlike' experience Richards finds 'the most interesting critical question there is', and it is this which he believes his modified impulse theory explains. Here he examines 'completeness': I think [it] depends upon the number and range of impulses active.
If only a certain group are aroused then, I said, we have an emotion liable to be disturbed. We have an incomplete development of our personality. By such work we are riveted in an attitude, like an effigy, not like a living man free to move as we please.
But if instead of one group we have very many widely differing impulses active and active so that they balance one another, then we get a state of poise, then we get this sense of completeness, of wholeness, of entirety, self-sufficingness.
Not a matter of a conflict. Two impulses pulling different ways that give a sense of frustration, bafflement. The difference may be put this 16 Ibid., p. 5. 17 Ibid., p. 8.
way: in a mere deadlock all we have is a definite set of impulses tugging different ways. In equilibrium fresh impulses are continually coming in. The whole state of mind is continually swaying away from the centre of balance and back again and across it.
It is by means of these fresh impulses brought in that the whole personality is engaged. And this gives the completeness to the experience. 18 The development of the lectures, then, provides evidence of Richards's deepening interest in equilibria, and a relative and corresponding neglect of harmonies of impulses. Indeed, the lectures show us why Richards was content to concentrate his analysis in this way; the readerly experiences associated with successful poetry were, and still are, as puzzling as they are powerful, whereas harmonies, while worthy, present no particular challenge to the understanding. This direction of travel is taken further in his subsequent books up to but not, as we shall see, including Practical Criticism (1929). In parallel with the progressive marginalisation of harmonies of impulses, particularly in Principles, there is a temporary adoption of a simpler and more readily misunderstood version of the theories of meaning that he was developing with Ogden. However, in late 1920 and early 1921, around the time of the lectures on Scott, Richards's interest in harmonies remained strong and was serving to enrich those theories.
IV. 'On Talking' (1921) and The Meaning of Meaning (1923) At the same time as Richards was giving these lectures he was also engaged with C. K. Ogden on the composition of articles eventually collected in The Meaning of Meaning (1923) . Their 'Symbolism' paper of 1920 had proposed a dual language hypothesis, with scientific and evocative functions, 19 but this was rapidly superseded by a further paper, 'On Talking', 20 a discussion that seems to bear the firm imprint of Richards's lectures. Indeed, Richards is listed as the first author, and it is tempting to speculate that the recasting of the dual language hypothesis as a five-term system was largely at his instigation, the terms being: 18 Ibid., pp. 9-10. • Strict symbolisation of reference.
• The expression of attitude to the listener or reader, for example amity or hostility.
• The expression of attitude to the referent.
• The promotion of effects intended.
• The reflection of ease or difficulty of reference.
Richards and Ogden suggest that the degree to which any sentence diverges from strict symbolisation 'will be due to disturbing factors' arising from one or more of the other four groups, 21 and that the normal type of utterance is of this 'mixed or rhetorical kind', as opposed to the 'pure, or scientific, or strictly symbolic'. 22 Thus, regarding them as variables that cannot all simultaneously be maximised, it is noted that even the lesser goal of optimisation is extremely unlikely:
Only occasionally will a symbolisation be available which, without loss of its symbolic accuracy, is also suitable (to the author's attitude to his public), appropriate (to his referent), judicious (likely to produce the desired effects) and personal (indicative of the stability or instability of his references).
What had been proposed in their earlier papers as a simple division of function, evocative and scientific, is now replaced with a flexible theory in which the five language functions appear in combinations where the relevance of one or more of them may lapse. Some of these combinations are highly salient, and deserve separate consideration. Science, for example, is a case in which only the strictly symbolic is relevant, and other functions may and should be neglected, while at the other end of the continuum we can describe a case where all the non-symbolic functions are present but there is no relevant reference.
With this combinatorial theory Richards could propose mixtures of the three emotional functions together with reference to explain any particular suasive utterance, and so account for the distinction between harmonies and equilibria of impulses. With science occupying the ideal and probably notional pole of pure reference, the mixed form described both the rhetoric, the arrangement of harmonies of impulses, and the aesthetic, where reference might be present but irrelevant qua reference to the generation of equilibria. Crucially, rhetorical utterance accounts for much successful literature, for the 'Coronach' or Tennyson's 'Break, Break, Break'. 21 Ibid., p. 63. 22 Ibid., p. 64.
However, this latter point became obscured in Principles of Literary Criticism since Richards was now engaged in an attempt to defend the aesthetic, and indeed to give it a privileged position, a goal that drove him back to the simpler, dual-language hypothesis of the 'Symbolism' article. The linguistic world now appeared to be divided into the pure reference of science, on the one hand, and poetry on the other, under which heading Richards now seemed to be concerned only with equilibria of impulses and the peculiar variety of utterances that produced them, utterances that in Science and Poetry he was to call, with far-reaching consequences, 'pseudo-statement'.
23 This term sat within a framework where he offered to 'distinguish between scientific statement, where truth is ultimately a matter of verification as this is understood in the laboratory', and 'emotive utterance, where "truth" is primarily acceptability by some attitude, and more remotely is the acceptability of this attitude itself -that it is not the poet's business to make true statements'.
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The subtlety of the combinatorial approach developed in 'On Talking' had disappeared, and in its place was something stark in its outlines yet simultaneously confusing to its readers. In later life Richards was to write that 'soon after its appearance I took a dislike to it without being very sure why': 'What seemed to me its best and most clearly stated points were, I found, understood in ways which turned them into indefensible nonsense.' 25 Richards's dissatisfaction and the confusion of his readers is unsurprising. The simplification was too great, not only excluding the vast range of utterance of a mixed type, but also failing to offer any satisfactory account of that large class of poems such as the 'Coronach' where some degree of reference qua reference does occur and is relevant. (1925) (1926) (1927) (1928) (1929) An opportunity to rescue this situation was about to offer itself, for even as he was completing Science and Poetry in late 1925 Richards had begun his first course of 'Practical Criticism' lectures, which ran from October to November. A visit to the United States, Japan, and, perhaps significantly, China in 1926 to 1927 saw him delivering this course in various other universities, and composition started in late 1927, shortly after the last lecture of the second Cambridge series. It rapidly became clear that it was more than the record of an experiment in readerly judgement. As Richards wrote in a letter to his wife: 'The more I turn it over the bigger it strikes me. Both in length and importance. It will hardly get under 100,000 words I doubt, and I now see a way of using it for all kinds of Meaning of Meaning arguments incidentally.' 26 Rather than retaining the simple and unsatisfactory distinction employed in Principles and Science and Poetry, he had taken up a system with close relations to the five-term system of 'On Talking', and The Meaning of Meaning (though the fifth term from 'On Talking', 'Reflection of ease or difficulty of reference' had been dropped) a correspondence that we can demonstrate in a simple table form:
V. Practical Criticism

Meaning of Meaning Practical Criticism
Reference Sense
Attitude to listener or reader Feeling
Attitude to the referent Tone
Promotion of effects intended Intention
Richards was returning to the examination of 'harmony', though this only appears in Appendix A, a section probably written late in the process, in early July 1928, when Richards observed to his wife: 'I'm on a very interesting line about feeling and sense and if I could get it worked out (and I'm fairly sure another spell will do it) I'd be very much advanced in all kinds of ways -it's something new and an extension in a rather unexpected degree of some Meaning of Meaning work. But very much to the point for poetry.' 27 Significantly, Richards engaged in a 'long consultation' with his former collaborators Ogden and Wood, a discussion that convinced him of the need to reconceive his book: 'More or less resolved now to make it into two books. Practical Criticism and another on the emotive function of speech (title to be found later).' 28 This plan was not realised, and we must rely on Appendix A, where we find Richards's thought apparently running on familiar lines before it unexpectedly delivers a remark of striking novelty: But thought governed by emotive classifications is still thought, and with words so used Function 1 (sense), though not in the most obvious way, may still be dominant.
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Alongside the pure reference of science, and the equilibria of certain kinds of poetry, there is now in addition 'thought governed by emotive classifications', and consequently utterances designed to bring impulses into harmony for a particular end once again had a place in the scheme. The analysis goes no further than this dense hint, but Richards would very soon find occasion for the further development, if not completion, of these ideas, for as the final text of Practical Criticism was being passed through the press for publication in May plans were being made for a return to China.
VI. Return to China (1929)
During his first visit to Peking in early 1927 the possibility of a longer stay had been discussed, and on 16 February 1929 Richards received an invitation to become Visiting Professor at Tsing Hua University for the academic year 1929-30. His wife Dorothea wrote in her diary that Richards was 'wild with excitement' at the prospect, and the offer was rapidly accepted. 30 Friends in China had already explained that Tsing Hua University was now a state institution and the 'apple of the Nanking Government's eye', a point which at the time seemed to have no more significance than the regular payment of salaries, though the highly politicised character was apparent to the Richards immediately on arrival, as Dorothea remarked in a letter to her mother and father: Started our first day at Tsing Hua on my birthday. Got up 7am, for we are twenty minutes from Tsing Hua which lies in a walled park of 100 acres, and we had to be by 9 o'clock at Convocation … The way from our gate, which is a large and handsome red building with a tiled roof full of dragons, leads out along a winding lane with a stream flowing beside it, and lovely willow trees like those on the Cambridge backs make a shade. The sun is still very hot though the nights are distinctly chilly.… Our meeting place was in a vast Hall holding 2,000 but with bad acoustic properties. There we met the President, who is a politician (already we have a lot of cross-purpose stories about him and the place). He is put in by the Kuomintang and is already replacing a lot of old teachers by his own nominees. All the teachers had to sit up on the platform while the President made an emphatic and interminable speech. But first we faced the portrait of Sun Yat Sen, while an officer shouted out his will and gave the word of command, at which we all bowed solemnly three times. Then there was another order for silent prayer for three minutes. The hall was decorated with slogans and nationalist flags.
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Richards was called upon to make a speech himself, and tactfully offered some uncontroversial observations on the importance of understanding between scholars, but in his teaching he found that 'Aristotle, Longinus, Dante, Milton, Boileau, Dryden, Coleridge, and Arnold' gave him 'unexpectedly much to say that seemed to have a direct bearing on Chinese current problems'. 32 It would appear, though, that this was not so much a case of Richards making an oblique approach to politics, but rather that such matters surrounded him on every side, leaving no other way of proceeding. Again, Dorothea's diary provides us with a compelling sketch:
Here we are at the moment in Paradise. We live in a Llama Temple -'The temple of True Consciousness' -turned by an ex-prime minister of China into a Palace of his own. All flowers and cassia bushes and marble terraces and altars and huge bronze incense burners and hills with aged pines and birds of paradise flashing from bough to bough. Here and there stand red lacquer pavilions, and we live in one of them. The fairy tale feeling is so strong that we might at any moment wake up to find ourselves in Cambridge. All the West and North 31 Ibid., 16 Sept. 1929, RCM. 32 Ibid., 20 Sept. 1929, RCM. horizon is hills. Ranges behind ranges going up to 8,000ft and easily reached. At night interminable frantic music is beaten out in the neighbouring village, and 8,000 troops in some barracks a mile away blow reveilles from 2am onwards. 33 Within two months Richards was contemplating permanent residence, 34 and though he felt isolated both from Europe and from his colleagues and students in Tsing Hua, this new world resonated with concerns on which he had already been working in Appendix A, as he explained to Raffaello Piccoli, Professor of Italian at Cambridge, and a fellow of Magdalene:
Students very able and incredibly charming but moving so much in another medium of thought and language from ours that they feel nearly as far off as fishes in a tank. I'm trying to get up courage enough to tackle a little Chinese. Though some of them talk and write remarkably good English, their mental habit is not ours. They think in what look like traditional figures of speech, to which context alone gives specific meaning. Their logic seems more like our poetry (without the poetry) than logic … I don't suppose I shall be able to find out anything in this short stay. 35 Nevertheless he wanted to try, and in an effort to learn something of the character and causes of this mental habit, Richards began a series of seminar discussions with colleagues at Yenching University. Judging from the earliest surviving trace of these meetings, a typed document headed 'Notes Towards a Technique of Linguistic Analysis, For the Use of my Chinese Collaborators, Yenching 1929', 36 their first meetings addressed general topics. This enthusiastic start was restrained by a severe infection of the cavity of the lower jaw requiring several operations, 37 but work was restarted in mid-May on a project to read Mencius. 38 He asked three colleagues, A. C. Li (Li An-Che), L. T. Hwang (or Huang), and Lucius Porter, all of Yenching, to meet for a series of more or less regular consultations. D. E. Richards's diary records meetings on 22 May, 4 June, and a 'final session' on 8 July, 39 and the Richards Collection contains several documents bearing on these sessions. This was not a superficial engagement, and Notebook 3 records notes on extensive conversations with Lucius Porter and L. T. Hwang, and detailed philological reflections on some of the major terms discussed in Mencius on the Mind. Three separate documents record papers read by Richards to sessions IV, VII, and what Richards refers to as the 'Final Occasion'. 40 On 29 October 1930 Richards began work on the composition of Mencius on the Mind, though the book was in fact completed during his stay at Harvard in early 1931, with the text finally being sent to his publishers in London on 4 May.
VII. Mencius on the Mind
There is a clear connection between 'thought that is governed by emotive categories' and thinking 'in what look like traditional figures of speech' with a 'logic [that] seems more like our poetry (without the poetry) than logic', but this matter is by no means clear in the text of Mencius itself, and seems to have eluded most readers. Richards himself remarks in a later essay that the book 'stammered away persistently' but never made its point, and admits that he 'doubts whether any whole was in any steady way in the mind of the sayer'. 41 Nonetheless, while Mencius on the Mind is certainly tentative, and difficult, its relation to Richards's earlier work is not beyond discernment.
In his own foreword Richards outlines four aims for his book:
1. 'to call the attention of those with a taste for analysis to a fascinating field for exploration -Chinese modes of meaning' 2. 'to discuss, more explicitly than is usual, the difficulties that beset every translator and every student of literature that is far removed in character from his own' 3. 'to apply the considerations which this discussion [i.e. that in item 2. above] brings out towards a clarification of our contemporary methods for controlling our meanings' 40 Box 11/Prose A, RCM. A note on the document relating to session IV remarks that the notes for sessions I and II are in the 'Middle Red backed notebook', a notebook now lost. 4. 'to present a Chinese view of psychology which seems relevant to the vexed question of science and value' 42 Of these, the first two are clear even in this abstract form, and easy to discern in the book, but the third and fourth aims are tantalisingly indeterminate. However, the direction of travel is rapidly made clear in the opening sections of Mencius, where Richards remarks that we must choose between alternative words to translate key Chinese terms because of their varying emotive effects, and he suggests that this is probably the way Mencius himself worked: 'In the case of Mencius the emotive components of the meaning probably take precedence of the sense components in ways which we would not consciously allow in our modern choices of words.' 43 The emotive theory being invoked here is to all appearances the simplified two-term version familiar from 'Symbolism' and from Principles, and the reader may be forgiven for seeing little more in it, but we are closer to the combinatorial theory in such remarks as the following when Richards observes that Mencius's 'method -even when his aim is severely prosaic -is frequently the method of condensed poetry': 'If we wished for a short description of the difference between Confucian philosophic method and, shall we say, Kantian, we could hardly do better than to say that the latter endeavours to use an explicit logic and the former an indicated guess.' 44 Bearing in mind that thought governed by emotive classifications is still thought, Richards subsequently goes on to note that Mencius's writings are 'dominated by suasive purpose', and are untroubled with the usual goals of logical dispute. Overall, Richards notes, 'the theoretic or general interest of securing intellectual adequacy is absent'. 45 Such latitude is possible because the conversants all shared basic principles, the respect for age, for example, and are concerned only 'with how this respect is determined', and 'not at all with justifying the respect, or inquiring into the reasons for giving it'. 46 This leads Richards to observe that their psychology is serving different purposes than it would in the idealised scientific form of Western thought: 'What they are doing is not so much enquiring into the nature of man as giving an account of it which will conduce to 42 Mencius on the Mind (London, 1932) p. xii. 43 Ibid., p. 17. 44 Ibid., p. 7. 45 Ibid., p. 55. 46 Ibid. the maintenance of these fixed, unquestionable observances.' 47 This leads him to a conclusion, softened by a concession that the same may apply to Western psychology, that Mencius's work is devoted to the maintenance of a pre-existing social and political order.
Probably the psychology of Mencius should be regarded … as an explanatory apology for a system of social practices of a ritual nature whose sanction, in the sense of compulsive authority, is elsewhere than in the doctrines of the sages. These doctrines would thus be constructions -historico-sociological in the case of Confucius, psychological in the case of Mencius -designed to give intellectual support to a system whose basis is social.
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At this point Richards surprises us. Admitting that such an account would seem to reduce the interest of Mencius's work to almost nothing, viewed from a scientific psychological viewpoint, he remarks:
But this would be taking too short a view of the matter. Even allowing great influence to the dominating social purpose, there is still room for plenty of variety in the conceptions developed in its service.… And it is arguable that the very fixity and stability of the purpose might in time allow the conceptions which best served it to take note of facts in a manner less confused by shifting intentions and metaphysical revolutions. Also that, if we can allow for the purpose, we can read the conceptions, as representations of facts, more clearly than we could otherwise.
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'Thought governed by emotive classifications is still thought', and may even have practical advantages in terms of its referential capacities, provided we know how to read it. Further, Richards notes that Mencius's openly suasive psychology reminds us that many of the conceptions of modern psychological research are 'equally influenced by extraneous purposes of a different and an opposed nature'. 50 The consequences of this are, frustratingly, never made explicit in Richards's remarks, but it seems reasonable to conclude that the covert nature of contemporary suasion is being presented as a threat to its referentiality. 47 Ibid., p. 56. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid., p. 59. 50 Ibid. However, Richards's most striking conclusion is the suggestion that the employment of psychology in the service of social suasion is justifiable if the consequences are themselves desirable, as his experiences in China had led him to believe they could be. (It should be remembered that he was thinking of the long-term formative influence of the Confucian tradition, not more recent developments under the Kuo Min Tang. Richards's respect for China's social order was profound and long-lasting, but tended to transcend local historical realities.) Having reminded us once more that Mencius was unconcerned with 'systematic observation and prediction', but only with the 'enforcement of a schema of conduct', he goes on to recommend that we contemplate the possibility of such a method ourselves:
It may well be that a purely scientific psychology could give us no self-control or power of influencing others except in such indirect ways as are exemplified by the administration of drugs or the use of exercises. If so, we should be forced probably to supplement scientific psychology with a fictional account of human nature in the interests of a finely ordered society and of reasonably unwasteful living. There may thus be another advantage in studying, if only as a set of fictions, the scheme of conceptions which has given both a fine and a very widely diffused civilization to the Chinese people.
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This resembles parts of the argument of Principles of Literary Criticism, and of Science and Poetry, where Richards had suggested that scientific knowledge may at present be too much for the mind to bear, and that science's emotional deficiencies must be supplied by poetry. However, the variations from this earlier view are very significant. While Science and Poetry had seemed to hold out the possibility that some future state of rational knowledge might be so complete and developed that emotional satisfaction could be derived from it, Richards here, more pessimistically, sees it as being inherently limited to mechanistic manipulation.
Moreover, the 'poetic' use of language commended in Mencius -the fictional account of human nature -is not simply the type in which reference is employed only as a means of producing equilibria of impulses with no consequent action, that is poetry, but a suasive type, one in which reference may actually be handled via evocative categories. Put still more simply and in terms of a Confucian doctrine we know Richards had already invoked in relation to his aesthetic views, the calm of the aesthetic 51 Ibid., p. 64. state must be supplemented by judicious use of harmonies of impulses to bring about concerted action towards desirable ends, ends which, as in the case of Chinese civilisation, are self-evidently valuable. This is the obscure fourth aim of the book, in which Richards proves to be making a fundamentally political recommendation. In his earlier writings he had suggested that science was insufficient to support personal emotional life, and must be supplemented by poetic manipulation of our impulses to form equilibria. He now suggests that science is insufficient as a basis for politics and morals, a point he illustrates by suggesting that the exercise of private and public virtue does not depend on and might be impaired by self-awareness. Suasive techniques were to be recognised as beneficial in maintaining a social consensus.
Overall, this was an extraordinary position, and one which may be regarded as much more dramatic a departure from earlier views than the relegation of science in Coleridge on Imagination. As a programme, and in the reduced form outlined above, it might seem strikingly irresponsible. After all, it is one thing to call for a supplementation of science by a judicious fiction, but it is quite another to deliver the means of evaluating such fictions, and of integrating them with scientific thought. But Richards does attempt, both in Mencius and in his later writings such as Interpretation in Teaching, to provide the means for such a discriminative use of language.
In Mencius the attempt will be found in the final chapter, 'A Technique for Comparative Studies'. The presentation is complex, but the salient features are simple enough for summary without gross distortion. Richards returns to the multiple functions of language first outlined in 'On Talking' and further developed in Practical Criticism. As in this latter work, he reduces the functions to four, but he finds a new set of names, and reorders them in accordance with the position outlined in the earlier parts of his study of Mencius. The following Intention comes first since Richards now regards all thought as purposive, 52 a position he had first indicated in Practical Criticism. Reference is reduced in importance, as an antidote to our prevalent belief that it is the main and most important language function. Indeed, it is this growth in our respect that most threatens us; suasive and fictionally oriented text requires careful reading, but the growth of science has made us careless in this regard, and while we may sometimes fail to recognise good suasion for what it is, rejecting it as bad reasoning, 53 we are as likely to make the parallel mistake of thinking that good suasion is good reasoning.
To guard against these errors, and to improve our ability to distinguish between better and worse suasive uses, Richards proposes that readers be trained in 'Multiple Definition', which he describes as 'accompanying any definition or distinction we make use of with a set of rival definitions in the background of our mind':
54 'Only so can we protect ourselves from the coercive suggestion of any one interpretation which seems for the moment to fit.' 55 Though necessary, indeed essential, harmonies of impulses could, as Richards had noted in 1921 lectures, capture the personality, 56 and only an interpretative scepticism could ensure that we derived the benefits of these language uses without becoming their slaves.
This final chapter constitutes the most detailed rearticulation of the dual-language hypothesis in Richards's work after The Meaning of Meaning, and though it surrenders some of the clarity of the earlier presentation, and may be thought to abandon science when it is most needed, it has merits, particularly the recognition that intention may be primary in communication. As a chapter in the history of Richards's thought it is crucial, being the first occasion in his writings subsequent to The Foundations of Aesthetics in which he attempts to deal with the distinction between harmonies and equilibria of impulses, and it is complementary to Coleridge on Imagination, which takes up the distinction again in a purely literary context, with the focus on equilibria. Mencius on the Mind, then, is an attempt to discuss the use of rhetorically induced harmonies of impulses in a socio-political connection, and the result is a programme that recommends enlightened ideological manipulation, a self-manipulation in the general interest, with the entire system being regulated by the discrimination of every individual as a reader. This is a very peculiar suggestion, but one which will be found repeatedly in Richards's later writings, which 52 Ibid., p. 88. 53 Ibid., p. 89. 54 Ibid., p. 91. 55 Ibid., p. 90. 56 Lecture 10, p. 7, Notebook 5, RCM.
are predominantly concerned with the good governance of thought by the arrangement of emotive categories.
Richards's standing as a psychologist has often been questioned, but in his defence it may be pointed out that, even if we do not accept his theoretical framework, the observations that both generate and facilitate the theories remain, a point of which Richards was himself quite aware, writing in 1921 that 'Even if my explanatory hypothesis of Balance is wrong the EXPERIENCE is there.' 57 These thoughts were again in his mind in the early 1930s, when he observed that '[it] is the merit of Coleridge's Fancy and Imagination as descriptive devices that they note such actual differences in the experiences they apply to', 58 and the same point may be made in relation to the prolonged discussion of 'equilibrium' and 'harmony' in Richards's work between 1920 and 1932. Poetic effects are powerful and, still, very puzzling, but after Richards the explanandum is that much clearer. 57 Lecture 10, p. 12, facing verso, Notebook 5, RCM. 58 I. A. Richards, Coleridge on Imagination (London 1934) p. 86.
